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Abstract
This paper explores potential explanations behind the educational gap between young natives and im-
migrants using two measures, negative attitudes towards immigrants and networking, which may influence
natives and immigrants differently. The paper considers, both theoretically and empirically, the impact
of negative attitudes and networking taking into account that these parameters may influence high and
uneducated workers as well as immigrants and natives differently, creating different incentives to acquire
education for the two ethnic groups. Using rich Danish administrative data, this paper finds evidence
that greater negative attitudes increase incentives for males to acquire education and that networking also
increases immigrant education.
1 Introduction
An OECD report from 2006 reveals that immigrant and immigrant offspring at a very young age express equal
or sometimes even higher motivation to learn mathematics than their native counterparts and very positive
attitudes towards school and education in general.1 However, at the age of 15, they under perform compared
to the natives. More than a third of the first and second generation immigrant children in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Norway and the USA, who have spent all their entire schooling in the host country,
perform below the baseline PISA benchmark for mathematics performance, a period at which students begin to
demonstrate the kind of skills that enable them to actively use mathematics.2 Furthermore, when taking their
parental background into account, immigrants tend not to perform as well in school as their native peers.3 This
fact may then, in turn, influence their choice of further education, and eventually their labour market outcome
and performance.
When explaining the educational gap between immigrants and natives, measures which influence immigrants
and natives differently are important. The aim of this paper is to discover the factors that shift the motivation
and performance of immigrants when the decision about education beyond compulsory school is taken. For
the educational decision, workers compare the value corresponding to acquiring education to the value of not
acquiring education. These values depend on the expected incomes which are influenced by both the employment
probability as well as wages. The novelty of this paper is to examine theoretically, as well as empirically, whether
negative attitudes towards immigrants and networking could influence immigrant employment chances, as well
as immigrant wages differently for educated workers and uneducated workers compared to the same variables for
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natives. In this case, the value of acquiring education may be impacted differently for natives and immigrants
and as such, may explain the educational gap between natives and immigrants.
In particular, we will examine the effect of negative attitudes towards immigrants in a region and potential
impact of networking through individuals of an individual’s own ethnicity living in a region. Negative attitudes
towards immigrants may cause discrimination, implying that workers are fired or decide to quit a job. This
lowers the value of employment, through both shorter employment periods and lower wages, as the bargaining
power of immigrants falls which in turn affects the value of acquiring education.
There are only a few empirical papers on discrimination and employment and wages (see for example Wa-
isman and Larsen 2015, Kofi Charles and Guryan 2008) but, to our knowledge, no papers on the additional
impact through these channels on education. Concerning networking, immigrants from the immigrant’s home
country or region may increase the likelihood of getting a job and improve labour market performance. Hence,
more well-educated immigrants from the immigrant’s home country or region may increase the return of edu-
cation, implying that more immigrants acquire education. This may work in different ways. Social networks
may influence employment outcomes: the more employed contacts the individual has, the more likely it is that
the individual will learn about new job openings (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004, Hellerstein et al 2009)
and networks may influence both wages and employment opportunities (Fontaine 2007, Galeanios 2014, Damm
2014). Similarly, empirical research confirms that (see for example Andersson et al 2009, Solignac and Tô 2015)
more immigrants living in areas with a large number of employed neighbours are more likely to have jobs than
immigrants living in areas with fewer employed neighbours. This could be due to networking and/or social norm
effects. Furthermore, Kramarz and Skans (2014) show for Swedish data that family network are important, in
terms of obtaining the first job after graduation, and that this impact is stronger for youth of uneducated parents
and immigrants inhabited in regions with high unemployment. Hence, networking may increase employment
probability, and more networking among immigrants may, to some extent, offset the decrease in employment
perspectives and wage modifications due to negative attitudes or discrimination.
We formulate a Becker-style taste discrimination model within a search and wage bargaining setting. Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002), Flabbi (2010), Mailath et al. (2000), and Lang et al. (2005) study discrimination in the
presence of search frictions but with no educational decision. We assume that potential negative tastes towards
immigrants imply that their separation rate from the job is higher than the separation rate of a native worker.
This may be due to both the worker deciding to quit and the employer firing the worker. This assumption
allows us to assume that neither job searchers nor employers know whether discrimination will take place in a
particular firm; all that is known is that immigrants face a higher separation rate than natives. We show that
immigrants’ potential higher separation rate, ceteris paribus, also implies that their employment chances fall
as firms, in turn, supply fewer vacancies. Natives and immigrants decide whether to educate or not. They are
aware of the existence of discrimination in the labour market and of the possibility of influencing their chances
of getting employed through networking. In terms of negative attitudes towards immigrants, we consider two
different cases. In the first case, all immigrant workers are affected by negative attitudes towards them and
in the second, only low-educated workers are affected. The channel through which the educational level is
affected by networking and negative attitudes in our model is through the impact on the expected employment
perspectives. However, the possibility that negative attitudes also influence the value of being unemployed also
directly, that is, over and above the impact on wages and employment chances, could easily be included in the
theoretical model and is consistent with the empirical analysis which we perform. We conduct the empirical
analysis on Danish Data due to the excellent quality of the Danish Register Data: we have the whole population,
can link to family members, and have information on employment, education, income, etc.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model is setup, then the following sections consider the
impact of negative attitudes towards immigrants and the fraction of immigrants. In Section 6 we consider het-
erogenous networking effects. Sections 7 and 8 provide a macro-econometric and a micro-econometric analysis.
Section 9 explores the robustness of the micro-econometric results, and Section 10 concludes.
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2 The Model
We consider a search and matching model with natives, N and immigrants, I, which may be educated with
productivity yh or noneducated with productivity, yl where yh > yl. The workers search for jobs and firms
search for workers and the labour force is normalised at one. For simplicity, we assume that firms may supply
vacancies directed towards natives or immigrants. We then include the two features, which may differ for
immigrants and natives, influencing their labour market performance differently and thereby their educational
decision - namely negative attitudes towards immigrants and networking effects. 4
Immigrants may be harmed by negative attitudes towards them at their workplace, resulting in separation
from the job. The reason may be many-fold: negative attitudes against immigrants may imply that a firm
needs to deal with unexpected issues in the firm or with clients, and/or the immigrant voluntary quits. Hence,
immigrants face a random negative shock. We therefore assume that the separation rate, smi , m = h, l, i = N, I,
may be increasing in negative attitudes towards immigrants, am, m = h, l, giving, smI = sN (1 + am) where
shN = slN = sN . Negative attitudes may (among other things) themselves be influenced by the fraction of
immigrants in an area, an issue we will return to below.
On the other hand, more immigrants may make it easier to obtain employment through networking. We
here follow Fontaine (2007) by assuming that networking, λmi , i = N, I, m = h, l is increasing in the number of
people of the same origin as the individual. We assume that λhI = th
I(1−eˆI)
(N+I)(1−eˆI) = t
hI, λhN = th
N(1−eˆN )
(N+I)(1−eˆN ) =
thN = th (1− I), λlI = tl IeˆI(N+I)eˆI = tlI and λlN = tl NeˆN(N+I)eˆN = tlN = tl (1− I) as N + I = 1, where
0 < tm < 1, m = h, l, and eˆi, i = N, I is the number of low-educated people and 1− eˆi, i = N, I, is the number
of educated workers. One may argue that a very large number of own ethnicity may not be as important as a
relative smaller number, a potential network may grow so big that it is not really a usually network in terms of
employment perspectives. This could be included in the analysis by changing the functional form of the network
variable, so that it is increasing in the number the worker’s own nationality but at a decreasing rate. We will
return to this issue below.
2.1 Matching
We assume that firms advertise V mi , i = N, I, m = h, l vacancies. Unemployment rates are given by umi , i =
N, I, m = h, l and there are Lmi , i = N, I, m = h, l employees. Labour market tightness by the ethnic group is
given by θmi = (V mi + λmi Lmi )/umi , where the transition rate for an unemployed worker is given by f(θmi ) and
for the firm it is q(θmi ). We assume that the worker transition rate is increasing in labour market tightness and
at a decreasing rate, ∂ (f(θmi )) /∂θmi > 0, ∂2 (f(θmi )) / (∂θmi )
2
< 0 and the firm’s transition rate is decreasing in
labour market tightness at a decreasing rate, ∂ (q(θmi )) /∂θmi < 0 and ∂2 (q(θmi )) / (∂θmi )
2
> 0.
2.2 The Firm
The firm chooses the number of vacancies so as to maximise profits subject to negative attitudes towards
immigrants and subject to networking effects. We assume, for simplicity, that firms can direct their search
towards natives or immigrants and that each worker produces ym, m = h, l and receives the bargained wage,
wmi , i = N, I, m = h, l. We denote the discount rate by ρ and hiring costs are increasing in productivity,
kym, m = h, l. A firm chooses the number of vacancies to advertise, V mi , i = N, I, m = h, l and takes into
account that its employees also produce applicants through networking. Each firm hiring natives or immigrants
solves the following Bellman equation:
ρΠi(Lmi ) = max((ymLmi − wmi − kymV mi + Πi(Lmi )) , i = N, I, m = h, l, s.t. (1)
4In Larsen and Waisman 2012, it is assumed that it is not possible for firms to direct their search to either immigrants or natives.
Therefore, any negative impact on immigrants, will through changed vacancy supply also affect natives. As the present paper also
include educational choice and networking we, for simplicity, keep this additional channel out of the present set-up.
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L˙mN = (λmNLm + V mN )q(θmN )− sNLmN , m = h, l, (2)
L˙mI = (λmI Lm + V mI )q(θmI )− smI LmI , m = h, l. (3)
Firms choose their optimal number of employees, using two methods of search: advertising by the firm
or networking, which happens at the rate λmi Lmj f(θmi ), i = N, I. Separation rates for immigrants, smI =
sN (1 + am) ≥ sN , which are dependents of negative attitudes, am, m = h, l may differ for low productivity
and high productivity workers. Hence, matches between immigrants and the firm may be dissolved more often
than matches involving natives and also may differ for high- and low-educated workers, implying that, for
given networking, the expected profitability of a firm employing natives may be different than the expected
profitability of employing an high and/or uneducated immigrant.
With identical firms, using equations (1)-(3) and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain the non-trivial solution
in the steady state determining labour market tightness, θmi , i = N, I,m = h, l:
kym
q(θmN )
= y
m − wmN
ρ+ sN − λmNq(θmN )
,
kym
q(θmI )
= y
m − wmI
ρ+ sN (1 + am)− λmI q(θmI )
. (4)
The partial equilibrium results are the following. More severe negative attitudes, a higher am, will tend to
reduce labour market tightness and more networking, a higher λmi , will raise labour market tightness for the
firm hiring the specific type, either immigrants or natives.
2.3 The Worker
Let Umi be the value of being an unemployed worker and Emi ,m = h, l, i = N, I be the value of an employed
worker. The values are determined by
ρUmi = f(θmi )(Emi − Umi )− Γ (m) c (ei) , i = N, I, m = h, l, (5)
ρEmI = wmI + smI (UmI − EmI )− Γ (m) c (ei) ,m = h, l (6)
ρEmN = wmN + sN (UmN − EmN )− Γ (m) c (ei) ,m = h, l. (7)
We assume that workers have different abilities, ei, and therefore different costs of obtaining education,
c (ei). The variable ei is uniformly distributed, ei ∈ [0, 1] where educational costs are decreasing in ability
at a decreasing rate, c′ (ei) < 0, c′′ (ei) > 0. In order to guarantee a non-trivial solution where some, but
not all, individuals choose to acquire education, the individual with the highest ability faces a very low cost
of education, c(1) = 0, and the individual with the lowest ability level face very high costs of education, i.e.
limei→0c(ei) =∞. Γ (m) ,m = h, l, is an indicator function, taking the value zero if the worker does not acquire
education and one, if the worker acquires education. Hence, Γ (h) = 1 and Γ (l) = 0.5
2.4 Wages
We assume that wages are determined by Nash bargaining and that the bargaining power is a half, so that
Xmi = Emi − Umi , i = N, I, m = h, l, where from equation (4) we have that Xmi = ky
m
q(θm
i
) =
ym−wmi
ρ+si−λmi q(θmi ) .
We assume that the hiring cost parameter, k, is equal across firms, but that productivity and therefore actual
5We assume that the educational cost is a cost to acquire and maintain education or skills. This is a simplifying assumption
and is not important for the results. The assumption enables us to use a model without having workers continuously being born
and dying. Such a model would deliver similar qualitative expressions.
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hiring costs are higher for firms employing educated workers. This gives that kym = Xmi q(θmi ) and thereby
Xmi =
ym − wmi + λmi kym
(ρ+ smi )
, m = h, l. (8)
Subtracting equation (5) from equation (6) or (7) and then using Xmi = Emi − Umi and (8) give
0.5 · ym (1 + (λmN + θmN ) k) = wmN , (9)
0.5 · ym (1 + (λmI + θmI ) k) = wmI . (10)
We note that wages are increasing in labour market tightness, networking and productivity. Substituting
for wages into the equation determining labour market tightness, we obtain the equations for labour market
tightness (8) as a function of parameter values and independently of productivity as hiring costs are a function
of productivity:
k(ρ+ smI )2 = (1− θmI k + λmI k) q(θmI ), (11)
k(ρ+ sN )2 = (1− θmNk + λmNk) q(θmN ). (12)
We note the following. Regarding relative separation rates we have that, if smI > sN , then the left
hand side of (11) is larger than the left hand side of (12) tending to reduce labour market tightness for
firms employing immigrants and thereby the transition rate for immigrants. Considering networking, la-
bour market tightness is increasing in labour networking: dθ
m
i
dλm
i
= kq(θ
m
i )
Dm
i
> 0, i = N, I, m = h, l, where
Dmi = − ((1− θmi k + λmi k) q′(θmi )− θmi kq(θmi )) > 0. If networking is higher for immigrants than natives,
λmI > λ
m
N , this tends to increase θmI relatively to θmN . However, if smI > sN this tends to increase θmN relatively
to θmI . Therefore, if smI > sN and λmI ≤ λmN then θmI < θmN , whereas the relative size is ambiguous if λmI > λmN .
For the rest of the theoretical analysis we assume that educated and uneducated workers face the same
networking effect, hence λhi = λli = λi, i = N, I. With this assumption we obtain that labour market tightness
is the same for high and low-educated natives, θhN = θlN = θN whereas we have two scenarios for immigrants. In
the first case, negative attitudes is present for both high and low productivity workers and hence shI = slI = sI
resulting in θhI = θlI = θI . In the second case, negative attitudes exist for educated workers only and hence
sN = shI < slI resulting in θhI > θlI . This assumption allows us to consider the impact of a change in attitudes
and immigration on labour market tightness, education and unemployment, without making any assumptions
about the relative importance of networking for educated or uneducated workers. We will in Section 6 below
discuss how the results are modified in the case of heterogeneous networking effects. We have the following
result.
Result: In case 1, where negative attitudes are present in both the high and low productivity sector, ah =
al > 0, and networking associated with natives is larger than or equal to networking associated with immigrants,
λN = λI then labour market tightness for natives is higher than labour market tightness for immigrants, θN > θI ,
and natives’ wages are thus higher than immigrants’ wages, wmN > wmI . In case 2, when negative attitudes
are present in the low productivity sector only, ah = 0, al > 0, and networking associated with natives is
larger than or equal to networking associated with immigrants, λN = λI , then for low productivity workers,
labour market tightness for natives is higher than labour market tightness facing immigrants, θlN > θlI , and low
productivity natives’ wages are thus higher than wages for low productivity immigrants, wlN > wlI whereas for
high productivity workers, θhN = θhI and whN = whI . When λN < λI , then the relative sizes of labour market
tightness and immigrants, θmN and θmI , and wages, wmN and wmI , are indeterminate.
Notice that given the assumption above that λI = tI and λN = t (1− I), where 0 < t < 1 we have that
λN > λI given 1/2 > I, which is the most realistic case. In case the networking function takes another form,
namely if it is increasing in the number of the worker’s own ethnicity but at a decreasing rate, for example,
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λI = tI1/2 and λN = t (1− I)1/2 , we will still have that λN > λI as long as 1/2 > I, but the impact of an
additional labour force participant is larger for immigrants than natives as long as immigrants are the minority.
2.5 Education
When individuals decide on whether to educate or not, they compare the value of acquiring education to the
value of remaining uneducated. That is, at each point in time, as an unemployed worker, they compare the
value of being unemployed as a educated worker to the value of being unemployed as an uneducated worker.
Workers with high educational costs find it too costly to obtain education, whereas high ability workers and low
educational costs individuals find it more than worthwhile to do so. The marginal worker has the ability level,
eˆi, i = N, I, which makes the worker just indifferent between acquiring education or remaining uneducated. For
simplicity, we assume that natives and immigrants are identical with respect to the distribution of educational
costs. We write the condition determining the educational costs of the marginal worker as
ρUhi (eˆi) = ρU li , i = N, I. (13)
The higher eˆi is, the higher is the ability level of the marginal worker acquiring education. Hence, fewer
workers acquire education, and a smaller fraction of the workers will be educated. Use equations (5)-(7) and
(13), the bargaining condition together with the free entry condition, to obtain the following simplified condition
in the first case where ah = al for immigrants and a = 0 for natives:
(
yh − yl) θik = c (eˆi) , i = N, I. (14)
Equation (14) gives eˆi, i = N, I as a function of the endogenous variables, θi, i = N, I. The higher the
productivity difference is, the higher are wage differences, and then the more people will acquire higher education.
For equal networking rate, labour market tightness facing natives is higher than labour market tightness facing
immigrants, which results in that natives acquire more education than immigrants, that is, eˆI > eˆN .
In the second case, the result changes for immigrants whereas the natives’ educational decision is still given
by equation (14), i.e. when ah = 0 and al > 0 then we obtain:
(
yhθhI − ylθlI
)
k = c (eˆI) . (15)
In this case, with equal networking rate for all workers, we now obtain that eˆN > eˆI as low productivity
immigrants are worse of than natives in terms of a lower transition rate into a job, θlI < θlN and lower wages and
high productivity immigrants have the same wages and employment probability as natives, θhI = θhN . Hence,
due to that the uneducated immigrants are relative worse of than natives, immigrants in this case experience
stronger incentives for acquiring education that natives. This is summarised in the following result.
Result: In case 1, where negative attitudes are present in both the high and low productivity sector, ah = al >
0, and networking associated with natives is equal to networking associated with immigrants, λN = λI , natives
acquire more education than immigrants, that is, eˆI > eˆN . In case 2, where negative attitudes is present in
the low productivity sector only, ah = 0, al > 0, and networking associated with natives is equal to networking
associated with immigrants, λN = λI , then immigrants acquire more education than natives eˆI < eˆN .
Notice here the significance of the networking assumption. In section 6 below we discuss the impact of
including heterogeneity and we discussed the nonproportionality of the networking function above.
2.6 Unemployment
In equilibrium, inflows are equal to outflows. The equilibrium flows characterising the labour market for workers
are then, f (θmi )µmi = smi nmi , i = N, I, m = h, l, and nhi + µhi = (1− eˆi) i, i = N, I, nli + µli = eˆii, i = N, I,
where nmi , i = N, I, m = h, l, is employment, and µmi , i = N, I, m = h, l, is unemployment. The labour force is
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normalised at one, N + I = 1, giving the following expression for natives’ unemployment rates, umN , m = h, l:
uhN = ulN = uN = sN/ (f (θN ) + sN ) , as θhN = θlN . For immigrants we have in the first case, shI = slI and hence
θhi = θli the following unemployment rates:
uhi = uli = ui =
si
f (θi) + si
, i = N, I. (16)
Unemployment rates for educated workers are equal to unemployment rates of uneducated workers. This
results stems from the assumption that hiring costs are proportional to productivity. In the second case, where
shI < s
l
I as ah = 0 and al > 0 then slI = sN (1 + al) > shI = sN and thereforef
(
θlI
)
< f
(
θhI
)
= f (θN ) which
results in the following unemployment rates
uN = uhI < ulI =
sI
f
(
θlI
)
+ sI
, i = N, I. (17)
The result is the following.
Result: When networking associated with natives is larger than or equal to networking associated with im-
migrants, λN ≥ λI and in the presence of negative attitudes for both high productivity and low productivity
immigrants, ah = al > 0, the unemployment rate of natives is smaller than the immigrants’ unemployment
rate, uN < uI and when only uneducated workers face negative attitudes, al > al = 0, then ulI > uhI = uN .
When λN < λI then the relative sizes of the unemployment rates facing natives and immigrants, uN and uI are
indeterminate.
3 Negative Attitudes
In this section, we examine what happens to labour market tightness, wages, education and unemployment
when immigrants face more severe negative attitudes. For simplicity, we consider the case where λN = λI .
The impact on labour market tightness, wages and unemployment as well as education will differ dependent on
whether negative attitudes towards immigrants exists in both sectors or in the low productivity sector only. We
have the following proposition.
Proposition: In the presence of negative attitudes for both high productivity and low productivity immigrants,
ah = al > 0, then when negative attitudes increase, labour market tightness facing immigrants falls, causing
their wages to fall and their unemployment rate to increase. Lower labour market tightness reduces education
of immigrants. When only low productivity workers face negative attitudes, al > ah = 0, then labour market
tightness and wages for low productivity immigrants falls and their unemployment rate increases whereas high
productivity immigrants are not affected, which increases education for immigrants. There is no impact on
natives.
Proof: First case: Differentiating equations (11), (12), (10) and (9) with respect to ah = al = a shows that
there is a negative impact on labour market tightness and wages facing immigrants but no impact for natives
dθI
da =
−k2
DI
dsI
da < 0,
dθN
da = 0,
dwmI
da = 0.5ym
dθI
da k < 0,
dwN
da = 0. Concerning unemployment and education, we
differentiate equations (16) and (14) with respect to a to obtain: duIda =
−sIf ′(θI)
(f(θI)+sI)2
dθI
da > 0,
duN
da = 0,
deˆI
da =
(yh−yl) dθIda
c′(eˆI) > 0,
deˆN
da = 0.
In the second case, the results for immigrants change to dθ
l
I
dal
= −k2
Dl
I
dslI
dal
< 0, dθ
h
I
dal
= 0, dw
l
I
dal
= 0.5ym dθ
l
I
dal
k <
0, dw
h
I
dal
= dwN
dal
= 0. Next, we differentiate equation (17) and (15) to obtain du
l
I
dal
= −sIf
′(θlI)
(f(θlI)+slI)2
dθlI
dal
> 0, du
h
I
dal
=
0, deˆI
dal
= −y
l dθ
l
I
dal
c′(eˆI) < 0. Q.E.D.
In the first case, where ah = al = a, an increase in negative attitudes increases the separation of immigrants
and therefore makes it less profitable to open a vacancy. The reduction in labour market tightness for immigrants
7
reduces their bargaining power and thereby their wages. Immigrants’ transition rate falls which together with
their higher separation rate increases their unemployment rate.
Concerning educational choice, the impact depends on the impact on employment perspectives for high pro-
ductivity workers relatively to the impact on low productivity workers. The reduced employment perspectives,
through lower employment chances and lower wages, affect both high productivity and low productivity workers.
However, due to higher productivity, the reduction in wages is going to be larger for high productivity workers
than for low productivity workers and therefore the incentives to acquire education fall. The result is that fewer
immigrants acquire education. As negative attitudes have no impact on the separation rate of natives, they are
not affected.
For the second case, that is, where ah = 0, al > 0, an increase in negative attitudes only increases the
separation of low productivity workers and only for the low productivity firms hiring immigrants, there is a
reduction in the profitability of opening a vacancy. The resulting reduced labour market tightness for low
productivity firms hiring immigrants increases uneducated immigrants’ unemployment rate. High productivity
immigrants are not affected as their separation rate is not affected.
When we turn to educational choice, the result changes compared to in case 1. The employment perspectives
for high productivity workers are not affected and as the employment perspectives of low productivity workers
worsens, the incentives to acquire education increase. In this case, we therefore obtain the opposite result
compared to in case 1, namely that more immigrants acquire education. Again, as negative attitudes have no
impact on the separation rate of natives, they are not affected.
As a caveat. Notice, that we could allow for the possibility that negative attitudes affect the value of being
unemployed also directly, and not only indirectly through wages and employment chances. In this case, the
impact on unemployment will not be affected, but if, in case 1, negative attitudes directly diminish the value of
being unemployment equally for uneducated and educated workers, then there is no impact on education. In
case 2, the direct impact will also, as the indirect through employment and wages, tend to increase education.
4 Immigration
In this section, we examine the impact on labour market tightness, wages, education and unemployment from
more immigration. Notice that λI = tI and λN = tN = t (1− I). The impact on labour market tightness,
wages and unemployment as well as education will differ dependent on whether negative attitudes towards
immigrants exists in both sectors or in the low productivity sector only. We have the following proposition.
Proposition: When the fraction of immigrants increases, labour market tightness facing immigrants increases,
causing their unemployment rate to fall and their wages to increase. The improved labour market prospects of
immigrants raise their level of education in both cases and the opposite holds for natives.
Proof: For both cases: Differentiating equations (11), (12), (10) and (9) with respect to I delivers a positive
impact on labour market tightness for immigrants and a negative impact on natives dθ
m
I
dI =
tkq(θmI )
Dm
I
> 0, m =
h, l, dθNdI =
ktq(θN )
DN
< 0, dw
m
I
dI = 0.5ym
(
t+ dθ
m
I
dI
)
k > 0, dw
m
N
dI = 0.5ym
(
−t+ dθmNdI
)
k < 0. Again for both case 1
and 2, we differentiate equations (16) and (17) with respect to I to obtain:
duI
dI
= −sIf
′ (θI)
(f (θI) + sI)2
dθI
dI
< 0, du
m
I
dI
= −s
m
I f
′ (θmI )
(f (θmI ) + smI )
2
dθmI
dI
< 0, duN
dI
= −sNf
′ (θN )
(f (θN ) + sN )2
dθN
dI
> 0.
Concerning education, for case 1, we differentiate equation (14) with respect to I to obtain: deˆIdI =
(
yh − yl) dθIdI /c′ (eˆI) <
0, deˆNdI =
(
yh − yl) dθNdI /c′ (eˆN ) > 0.
In the second case, the result for education for immigrants is: deˆIdI =
(
yh
dθhI
dI − yl dθ
l
I
dI
)
/c′ (eˆI) < 0, which is
negative as dθ
h
I
dI >
dθlI
dI . Q.E.D.
More immigrants will induce the fraction of immigrants to increase, improving networking and thus labour
market tightness for firms hiring immigrants and therefore immigrants’ transition rate. Similarly, networking
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among natives fall, and thereby labour market tightness for natives falls. As networking both directly and indir-
ectly has a positive impact on immigrants’ wages, their wages increase whereas natives’ wages fall. Furthermore,
the increase in immigrant’s transition rate reduces their unemployment rate and the corresponding reduction in
natives’ transition rate raise their unemployment rate. Finally, concerning education for immigrants, improved
labour market conditions due to more networking are better for high productivity workers than low productivity
workers, wherefore education increases.
As an illustration, consider the situation where a = 0 and hence sI = sN and initially N = I. In this case,
labour market tightness facing immigrants is equal to labour market tightness facing natives. The fraction of
educated immigrants and natives are also identical, eˆI = eˆN and thereby c′ (eˆI) = c′ (eˆN ). The increase in
educated natives is therefore equal to the fall in the fraction of educated immigrants. However, a more realistic
setup is where N > I so that θN > θI and thus eˆI > eˆN (the fraction of natives acquiring skills is higher than
the fraction of immigrants acquiring skills). In this case, c (eˆI) < c (eˆN ) , and |c′ (eˆI)| > c′ (eˆN ) , the impact
through the lower educational costs will increase the impact on education. However, substituting from equation
(11) and (12) we obtain that the positive impact of networking is smaller for immigrants than the negative
impact from networking for the natives, |dθI/dI| < dθN/dI. Hence, given N > I initially, the impact from
an increase in the number of immigrants on their educational level may be smaller or larger than the negative
impact on the educational level facing natives.
5 Immigration and Negative Attitudes
In this section we expand the model by allowing for the possibility that a higher fraction of immigrants aggravates
negative attitudes, giving for case 1, shI = slI = sN (1 + a (I)) and for case 2, shI = sN and slI = sN (1 + a (I)).
The idea is that more immigrants around increases the possibility of a multiethnic society, which for some people
is a negative development. As results now in general becomes ambiguous we consider the special case where
the the matching function takes the form XmI =
√
vmI u
m
I and that a′ (I) = 1.The impact on natives is identical
to the impacts above.
Proposition: Natives are affected as above. For immigrants we have the following. In the first case, dif-
ferentiating equations (11), including the matching function, XmI =
√
vmI u
m
I with respect to I where now a(I)
we obtain dθ
m
I
dI pa(I)=
−k(sNa′(I)
√
θm
I
−t)
(k(ρ+smI )1/
√
θm
I
+k) . Substituting for the solution for labour market tightness we obtain
the condition for a′ (I) = 1 dθ
m
I
dI pa(I)Q 0 ⇔ z R I, where z = sN (2ρtk+sN (1−2tk))−t
2k
s2
N
tk
. This implies that for
case 1 we obtain dw
m
I
dI pa(I)Q 0 and
deˆI
dI pa(I)⇔ z R I,and that du
m
I
dI pa(I)> 0 for z ≥ I. In the second case, we
obtain where dal/dI = 1 that dθ
l
I
dI pal(I)=
−k
(
sN
√
θl
I
−t
)
k(ρ+sl
I
)1/
√
θl
I
+k
and dθ
h
I
dI pal(I)=
tk
k(ρ+sl
I
)1/
√
θl
I
+k
> 0. For wages we
have dw
l
I
dI pal(I)Q 0 z R I ,
dwhI
dI pal(I)> 0, and education increases,
deˆI
dI pal(I)< 0 and unemployment increases if
dulI
dI pa(I)> 0 for z ≥ I, and du
h
I
dI pa(I)< 0. .
The impact of immigration on labour market performance for immigrants now becomes ambiguous. The
reason is that more immigration improves networking and thereby employment chances and wages, but at the
same time, negative attitudes may become more severe which reduce labour market tightness again. In the
first case, where ah = al = a (I) > 0, the positive impact through networking on labour market tightness is
more important than the negative impact through increased negative attitudes if the fraction of immigrants is
sufficiently high. The condition for a positive sign for labour market tightness is dependent on the separation
rate and the networking effect, so that in this case, the separation rate has to be low, low s, relatively to the
networking effect, high t. In the second case, ah = 0, al = a (I) > 0, high productivity workers are not affected
and low productivity workers are effected as in case 1, implying that education unambiguously increases, as the
relative gain of acquiring education increases.
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6 Heterogeneous Networking Effects
In this section we allow the networking effects to differ for uneducated and educated workers as well as for
natives and immigrants.6 First, we consider the case where smI > sN , m = h, l, which results in the left hand
side of (11) being larger than the left hand side of (12) and therefore tends to reduce labour market tightness for
firms employing immigrants and thereby the transition rate for immigrants. Therefore, when immigrants face
more networking than natives, λmI > λmN , we cannot determine the relative size of θmI and θmN as this networking
effect would tend to increase labour market tightness for immigrants relative to natives. For the rest of this
section we therefore consider the case where networking for immigrants is lower than networking for natives.
Regarding education, we now need to consider the more general equation, allowing labour market tightness
to differ both for educated and uneducated natives as well as immigrants :
(
yhθhi − ylθli
)
k = c (eˆi) , i = N, I. (18)
To begin with, we assume that networking is the same for educated and uneducated immigrants and consider
first the case where λhN > λlN . In this case, educated natives are more efficient using the network and we obtain
that θhN > θlN > θhI = θlI = θI , resulting in higher wages for educated native workers than uneducated native
workers, (see equation (9)), who then in turn, as before, receive higher wages than immigrants (see equation
(9) relative to (10) inserting for labour market tightness and networking). Furthermore, considering education,
using equation (18) we obtain that a higher fraction of natives than immigrants acquire education, eˆI > eˆN ,
as yhθhI − ylθlI < yhθhN − ylθlN if and only if yl
(
θlN − θlI
)
< yh
(
θhN − θhI
)
as there is a larger gain involved for
natives than immigrants acquiring education.
If instead, uneducated native workers are better at networking than educated natives workers, λhN < λlN ,
then there are relative more vacancies supplied towards uneducated native workers than educated native workers
and hence, θlN > θhN > θhI = θlI = θI . In this case, the order of educated native wages and uneducated native
wages become ambiguous as the higher productivity of educated natives will tend to raise whN relative to wlN
whereas the higher networking effect for uneducated natives both directly and indirectly through a higher labour
market tightness will tend to increase wlN relative to whN . In terms of education, we cannot tell whether eˆI > eˆN
or eˆI ≤ eˆN as yl < yh but θlN −θlI > θhN −θhI as θlN > θhN and θhI = θlI = θI . This is the case as good networking
for uneducated natives means that being uneducated tends to be more attractive for natives, but on the other
hand, as networking is still better for educated natives than immigrants, this will tend to increase the number
of educated natives.
Next, we allow the networking variable to vary also for immigrants. First, we consider the case where
uneducated immigrants are more efficient using their network, that is, λlI > λhI . When λhN = λlN then θhN =
θlN > θ
l
I > θ
h
I , implying that natives are better paid but we cannot tell whether the uneducated immigrants or
the educated immigrants earn the most, as the higher networking and labour market tightness for uneducated
workers compared to educated workers tends to raise wages for this group but the latter group of immigrants
has a higher productivity than the former. In this case, eˆI > eˆN as θhN = θlN and θlI > θhI implying that
uneducated immigrants are relative better off than educated immigrants in terms of transition into work. When
instead λhN > λlN then θhN > θlN > θlI > θhI , the conclusion concerning relative wages for natives is as above
when we considered the same relative networking effects for natives and indeterminate for immigrants. We also
have that eˆI > eˆN as the uneducated immigrants are relative better off than educated immigrants in terms of
transition into work and the reverse holds for natives, making the impact even stronger. Finally, when λlN > λhN
then θlN > θhN > θlI > θhI . Here the relative sizes of low and educated wages are ambiguous for both natives and
immigrants and we cannot determine the relative skill levels for natives and immigrants as we do not know the
relative size of θlN − θhN and θlI − θhI .
When there are more educated immigrants than uneducated immigrants, that is, λhI > λlI , then θhI > θlI , and
relative labour market tightness for natives and thereby wages will vary as above dependent on the relative size
6As we do not allow networking effects to depend on the number of each educational type (as then labour market tightness
would be a function of eˆi, i = N, I ) then this corresponds to assuming that tm is different for the two different educational types.
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of λhN and λlN . Here, we know that whI > wlI as networking, labour market tightness and productivity move in
the same direction. We cannot determine whether a higher fraction of immigrants or natives acquire education
as we do not know the relative size of θlN − θhN and θlI − θhI .
In the second case, when negative attitudes exist for low productivity workers only, that is when, sN = shI <
slI , then if networking is the same for uneducated and educated immigrants, but higher for educated natives
than uneducated natives, i.e. λhN > λlN > λhI = λlI , then we obtain θlN > θhN > θhI > θlI and the wage order
is similar and the order of unemployment rates is uhN < ulN < uhI < ulI . We cannot determine the relative size
of eˆI and eˆN unless we know the relative size of θhN − θhI and θlN − θlI . If instead, uneducated native workers
have a better network than educated natives workers, λhN < λlN , then there are relative more vacancies supplied
towards uneducated native workers than educated native workers and hence, θlN > θhN > θhI > θlI . As above with
equal separation rates for immigrants, we cannot determine the relative size of immigrant wages and education,
as yl < yh but θlN − θlI > θhN − θhI .
When uneducated immigrants have a better network than educated, that is, λlI > λhI , then when λhN = λlN
we obtain that θhN = θlN but we cannot determine the relative size of θlI and θhI , something which still holds
when λhN > λlN where for natives we now obtain θhN > θlN and we can still not determine the relative size of
labour market tightness for immigrants. Finally, when λlN > λhN then θlN > θhN and the relative size of θhI and θlI
remain ambiguous. Relative wages follow the order of labour market tightness for natives and are indeterminate
for immigrants. We cannot determine whether eˆI > eˆN or eˆI ≤ eˆN as we do not know the relative size of θhI
and θlI .
When educated immigrants are more efficient using their network than uneducated, that is, λhI > λlI then
we obtain the same relative labour market tightness for educated and uneducated natives as above as well as
wages. In none of these situations, we can determine the relative skill levels for natives and immigrants as we
do not know the relative size of θlN − θhN and θlI − θhI .
7 Macro-econometric Analysis
7.1 Data
In this section, we test the model predictions regarding the impact of networking and negative attitudes on
education. We consider macroeconomic data for Denmark in 2002 and explore the variation between muni-
cipalities. Denmark is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there is detailed and rich data available both at the
municipality and individual level (where we have data for the whole population) which enables the impact of
negative attitudes on education to be examined both at the macro and micro level. Secondly, the educational
structure of Denmark allows us to explore an individual’s decision of whether to attend high school, which is
non-compulsory, after the completion of compulsory education at a young age. As this decision takes place at
such a young age, mobility of the student is of very little concern, which is discussed further below. In 2002,
there are 275 municipalities in Denmark. 2002 is chosen as there is a general election in 2001 and it is well
prior to 2007 when the 275 municipalities are merged into 98 municipalities. The fundamental idea behind
using macro data is to potentially show some correlation between the general prevalence of negative attitudes
in a municipality and the expected return to education, through employment perspectives and the fraction of
immigrants attending high school. The impact may thus be both direct and indirect, and in this sense we
may capture something different than if we were to only consider micro data. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
nature of the theoretical model, makes the macro-econometric analysis a natural starting point. As controls, we
include gross income per capita in the municipality, population density, a dummy for the presence of at least
one high school in a municipality, and the percentage of the labour force (LF) with short, medium and long
tertiary education. Throughout the macro section, we examine the fraction of both immigrants and descendants
attending high school and use the terms immigrants and descendants and immigrants interchangeably.
In order to disregard mobility issues, we examine the high school decision as a function of immigration and
attitudes as well as other explanatory variables. For example, we want to avoid a case where a lack of networking
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possibilities or negative attitudes causes the student to move. High school students are most likely to stay at
home during their high school education and we consider the possibility that parents move as a reaction to
the networking or negative attitudes to be tiny (however, we do approach this possibility in the Robustness
Section).
Our main dependent variable is the fraction of immigrants in a municipality at age 16 attending any high
school in year 2002. In Denmark, students’ first year in high school will be when they are 15-16 years old. Only
the first 9 years of schooling are obligatory in Denmark.7 High school is optional, and most of the students
beginning high school will graduate with a high school degree. Moreover, in this paper we aim to evaluate
whether the potential impact of negative attitudes and immigration on relative labour market performance for
educated and uneducated workers influence the decision to begin high school.
As the negative attitude variable we consider two different measures. The first variable is the fraction of
votes for two parties, Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti due to their emphasis on reducing immigration.8
One potential concern in using voting data is that immigrants may not vote for parties who emphasise reducing
immigration. This would be problematic for our measure of negative attitudes as municipalities with higher con-
centrations of immigrants could actually have few votes for Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti. However,
the voting behaviour of immigrants and descendants is unable to influence our measure of negative attitudes
as only natives are permitted to vote in general elections. As such, the voting data is a good measure of the
negative attitudes of natives against immigrants. Furthermore, the 2001 general election campaign had a huge
emphasis of immigration, implying a large increase in the votes for Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti.
The second variable is taken from a survey and is the fraction of surveyed persons in a municipality who answers
that they agree that immigrants should be sent back to their home country if there is no more work for them
in Denmark. There are 1500 respondents to the survey. For the networking variable, we include the fraction of
immigrants and descendants relative to the total population in the municipality.
Figures 1 and 2 show the dispersion of the fraction of votes for Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti and
the fraction of immigrants and descendants residing in the municipality. Votes for the two parties are relatively
scattered across Denmark, with a high concentration of municipalities with a large fraction of votes for both
parties near the Danish/German border. Immigrants and descendants are also scattered across Denmark, with
the exceptions that they tend to reside closer to large cities (Aarhus, Odense, and the greater Copenhagen area)
as well as near the Danish/German border.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the municipal data. While the total number of municipalities in
Denmark during the time period is 275, we drop 9 municipalities as there were no 16 year old immigrants
residing in them.9 From Table 1, it is seen that the average share of 16 year old immigrants in high school is
about 33.1% while it is larger for natives, 52.9%.
[Table 1 about here.]
For immigrants, the minimum share is 0 and the maximum share is 1, so there are municipalities with no
16 year old immigrants in high school and we also find municipalities with 100%. These extreme numbers are a
7Only recently a grade zero has become obligatory.
8Fremskridtpartiet’s webpage: http://www.fremskridtspartiet.dk/page9.html (all in Danish: main idea: immigrants may stay
for shorter or longer periods).
Dansk Folkeparti’s webpage (http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/ The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_Peoples_Party): Den-
mark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society.
Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which
develops along the lines of Danish culture.
It ought to be possible to absorb foreigners into Danish society provided however, that this does not put security and democratic
government at risk. To a limited extent and according to special rules and in conformity with the stipulations of the Constitution,
foreign nationals should be able to obtain Danish citizenship.
Other Danish parties may also be interested in limiting immigration but not to such an extent that it is on their official webpage.
9The municipalities we drop are: Fuglebjerg, Holeby, Højreby, Rudbjerg, Sydlangeland, Nørhald, Fjends, Læsø and Åbybro.
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consequence of the size of the municipality and the total number of 16 year old immigrants in such municipalities
and therefore describe the behaviour of only a very limited set of individuals. In an alternative specification, we
will present regression results weighted by a relevant measure of population to better try to take such features
of the data into account.
The two measures used for negative attitudes have average values of 13% (election data) and 20 % (survey
data) respectively. The network measure for immigrants is on average 4.9%, while the pseudo-network variable
for natives has an average of 95.1%. The average values of the different unemployment measures range from
3.6% to 11%, with the maximum average value for the immigrants from non-Western countries. The average
(of average) gross income level per capita is 173000 DKK and the average population density is 0.271 people
per square kilometre. Population density is included to account for the degree of urbanisation of a municipality.
The average shares of the population with a short, medium and long education respectively are 40%, 11% and
3%. Comparing the mean values and the medium values of all variables we see that in some cases – especially
for variables involving immigrants – the distributions are quite skewed.
7.2 Econometric Model and Results
As stated above, we want to disregard mobility taken by the individual due to different labour market conditions
or attitudes. We therefore estimate
the high school decision by examining the following model:
(1− eˆr) = β0 + β1ar + β2λr +
∑
η
βrηControlsrη + εr, r = 1, ..., 266. (19)
The left hand side variable, (1− eˆr), is either the fraction of young 16 years old immigrants/descendants
attending high school in year 2002 (our main group of interest) or for control purposes the same type of fraction
for natives. Ideally, for identification we would expect both the attitude and the network variables to be
significant for immigrants while being insignificant for natives. We examine whether negative attitudes, ar, and
the fraction of immigrants through a potential networking effect, λr = tI have any impact on the fraction of
young immigrants (16 years old) attending high school.
Table 2 presents estimation results of equation 19, where columns (1) and (2) use the voting measure of
negative attitudes for natives and immigrants respectively, while columns (3) and (4) use the survey measure of
negative attitudes for natives and immigrants respectively. Consistent with expectations, the negative attitudes
voting measure is negative and significant at the 10% level for immigrants, with a coefficient of -1.993. This
implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of votes for the two parties leads to a decrease of
approximately 2 percentage point in the fraction of 16 years old immigrants who chooses high school.10 The
negative effect of negative attitudes on immigrants’ educational attainment is consistent with case 1 of the
model, where negative attitudes are present in both the low and high productivity sectors. The coefficient of
the immigrant networking variable is positive and also significant (at the 1% level), consistent with both cases
of the model. For the immigrant estimation, most of the coefficients of the control variables are imprecisely
estimated and insignificant. In fact, the only variable which is significantly estimated (at the 10% level) is the
dummy for high school presence. This coefficient is as expected positive.
[Table 2 about here.]
For the natives regression, we expect to find no significance for the negative attitude and networking variables.
For both variables the coefficient estimates are in fact significant even though the size or sign of the coefficients
are different from the immigrant case. The coefficient of the attitude variable for the natives is less than half
the size of what is seen for immigrants and the coefficient of the networking variable has the opposite sign:
10For example, if Hørsholm with initially 8.7% votes for the two parties increased this share to 9.7% (the level of Hillerød)
and assuming that all other variables for Hørsholm are kept unchanged this will lead to the expected change in high school rate
mentioned in the text.
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increasing the fraction of natives residing in a municipality decreases the fraction of natives enrolled in high
school. One potential explanation of this negative effect could be that larger shares of natives reside in more
rural municipalities, and these rural municipalities are also less educated. In addition, for natives, only the
population density control is significant (5% level) and negative.
Examining the results based on the survey measure of negative attitudes, we get somewhat different results
for immigrants. The negative attitudes variable for immigrants is still negative but now insignificant, and the
size has decreased to -0.103. The network variable is still very significant, although somewhat smaller in size.
Finally the high school dummy is significant (at 10% level) and positive as expected. The other control variables
are, as before, insignificant. The results for the natives are essentially unchanged. It is worth noting that the
number of observations is much lower when using the survey variable for negative attitudes; this is due to the
rather limited number of replies to the survey in certain municipalities, and those municipalities are dropped
from the estimation. As a consequence, the different results for the two attitude measures may relate to the
measures being different or to the differences in the samples on which the estimations are based.
In general, the results of the macro estimation are not quite as expected based on the propositions of the
theoretical model. To improve the model we have first tried various non linear specifications, such as adding
the square of the population density measure and adding interaction terms of our two explanatory variables of
interest, and in none of these extended specifications did we get more significance. 11
Next, we consider the possibility that maybe the equal weighting in the OLS estimation of both small
and large municipalities have been influencing our results. In one additional regression we drop municipalities
with less than five 16-year-old immigrants, and no fundamental changes in the results were observed (results
are available upon request). As mentioned previously, we also weight the OLS regressions of (19) by the
number of 16-year-olds immigrants or natives, respectively. Table 3 shows results for such weighted regressions.
When doing so, all significance in the negative attitude measures disappears for the immigrant estimations, the
magnitude of the networking variable falls for the immigrant estimation but still remains significant, and the
estimation for natives is basically unchanged for the attitude and networking variables. Hence, after having
performed these weighted regressions, the regressions for immigrants are somewhat sensitive, while we find quite
a large amount of robustness for the natives regressions. These findings seem to indicate that, to a large extent,
small municipalities with few 16 year old immigrants drive the earlier results. On the one hand this is perhaps
unsurprising, as one may expect that the effects of negative attitude may be stronger in small and less urban
municipalities, while on the other hand, it also points to the desirability of moving towards an analysis using
individual level data.12
[Table 3 about here.]
Despite the fact that we find some support for our theoretical prediction for networking among immigrants,
moving to the individual level enables many individual and family level factors to be taken into account which
cannot be at the municipal level. This is particularly important given that the results at the municipal level
appear to be driven by municipalities with few number of 16 year old immigrants. Section 8 estimates the
impact of negative attitudes on the educational choices of 16 years old immigrants and natives rather than on
the share of immigrants and natives attending high school in a municipality, allowing us to better capture the
relationship between negative attitudes and an individual’s educational decisions.
11We also investigated whether multicollinearity might be a problem for significance of many of our explanatory variables but
simple correlations and other indicators did not point towards major problems of this kind.
12We also collected additional data to try to benefit from the advantages from allowing for fixed municipality effects in a two
wave panel framework. This exercise was performed for the election measure of the attitude variable only. Hence, we collected
election data from the general election in 1998 and the other variables for 1999. Again no improvement was observed based on the
estimation of such a fixed effects model (results are available upon request).
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8 Micro-econometric Analysis
8.1 Data
In order to examine the individual level relationship between immigrant high school attendance and negative
attitudes towards immigrants and networks, we use detailed Danish Register Data made available by Statistics
Denmark. Danish Register Data is a database containing detailed information on every resident of Denmark from
1980-present. The data is interlinked across various government and administrative sources by an anonymous
personal identification number, so individuals are also observed overtime. As with the macroeconomic analysis,
we consider an immigrant’s high school decision in 2002. The data used contains similar, but more detailed
information compared to the macro-econometric data and is composed of: education history (information such
as where an individual attends school and what qualification they are studying towards and have already
achieved); demographic information such as gender, age, and municipality of residence; immigration history
(including an individual’s nationality, exact date of immigration, and whether an individual is a 1st or 2nd
generation immigrant; and household characteristics such as family composition and parental information. As
individuals are linked to their parents, it is possible to include factors such as parental education, employment
history, and marital status, all of which will likely affect an immigrant’s high school decision.
To capture negative attitudes, we use the same voting data at the municipal level, and many other control
variables which are included in the macro-econometric analysis are also included as controls in the micro-
econometric analysis. In the micro section, we also consider the high school choice of both immigrants and
descendants in one measure. We do so in order to explore how the effects of negative attitudes on education
depend on an individual’s gender, as sample sizes when combining the two groups are sufficiently large.13 By
using individuals’ municipalities of residence, we are also able to construct exact sums of immigrants from
a certain nation residing in every Danish municipality. By interacting these sums with an immigrant’s own
nationality, we are able to recreate an individual’s potential network based on the fraction of the population living
in his municipality from his homeland (excluding the immigrant him or herself). For 16 year old immigrants
deciding whether to attend high school, the presence of other immigrants from their homeland may significantly
impact this decision. Using education and employment data, we are able to construct the education and
employment levels of immigrants by nationality for each municipality, which is consistent with the influence of
immigration through networking in the theoretical model presented above.
Summary statistics of all relevant variable are included in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
8.2 Econometric Model and Results
We estimate the following equation separately for natives and immigrants/descendants:
(1− eˆi) = β0 + β1FracOwnNatEducr + β2FracOwnNatEmpr
+ β3FracOwnNatr + β4ar + β5ParentEdup+∑
µ
βrµMuncControlsrµ +
∑
η
βiηHHControlsiη +Origini + εi, (20)
where (1− eˆi) is the educational decision of individual i represented by a dummy variable if an individual is
attending any high school or not, which is determined by: three networking variables — FracOwnNatEducr,
FracOwnNatEmpr, and FracOwnNatr which represent the fraction of individuals of the same nationality
residing the same municipality r who have (at least) a high school education, the fraction of same nationality
individuals residing the same municipality r who are employed, and the fraction of same nationality individuals
residing the same municipality r respectively; ar, negative attitudes captured by the fraction of votes for both
13Section 9.2 provides a comparison of the high school choice of immigrants and descendants.
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Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti in municipality r; ParentEdup, the years of education of parent p
where p = mother, father, MuncControlsr; municipal factors such as population density and the fraction of
immigrants/natives unemployed which may affect an individuals education decision; HHControlsi, additional
household controls such as parental employment status, total household income, and parental marital status;
Origini, origin country dummies that capture educational differences across specific immigrant/descendant
home countries; and εi, residual unobservables which are clustered at the municipality level. In order to identify
the effects for immigrants/descendants, we separately estimate equation (20) for natives and for immigrants
and descendants.
Tables 5 and 6 present results for males and females respectively. Similar to the municipality estimation,
columns (1) and (2) present results for natives and immigrants respectively. Column (3) is provided for the sake
of comparison and includes only the municipal fraction of own nationality immigrants as a measure of networking,
as this is a measure which is directly comparable to our networking measure in the macro-econometric analysis.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Examining males in Table 5, the fraction of own nationality individuals employed significantly increases the
propensity of an immigrant to attend high school, where a one percentage point increase in the fraction of own
nationality immigrants employed residing in the municipality would lead to a 0.48 percentage point increase
in the probability of attending any high school. No equivalent significant effects are seen for natives, a finding
which is consistent with networking amongst immigrants. The other networking variables, the fraction of own
nationality individuals residing in the same municipality and the fraction of own nationality individuals with at
least a high school education, are imprecisely estimated for both natives and immigrants. This is consistent with
our theoretical model, where employment prospects are key in determining the level of education an individual
obtains, and it is reassuring that networking in terms of employed immigrants matters. The negative attitudes
measure significantly increases an immigrant’s probability of attending high school, where a 1 percentage point
increase in the fraction of votes for either political party significantly increases the probability of attending
any high school 1.5 percentage points, while no effects are seen for natives. For both natives and immigrants,
household controls matter a lot for an individual’s propensity to attend high school, with education, employment,
and marital status of both parents significantly increasing the probability of attending high school in nearly all
specifications.
For females, in Table 6, a different picture is seen. While the fraction of own nationality immigrants leads
to a significant and positive increase in the probability of attending high school for immigrants, a significant
negative effect is seen for natives for the fraction of own nationality natives with education to high school
or beyond. For both natives and immigrants, the negative attitudes measure is insignificant on high school
attendance. Similar to the male estimation, parental education, employment, and marital status significantly
increase the probability of attending high school for both natives and immigrants.
Contrary to the macro-econometric analysis we find evidence that for males, negative attitudes towards
immigrants increase the propensity of an immigrant/descendant to attend high school. For females, this effect
is insignificant. For natives, no significant effects are seen for males nor for females. These differences from the
macro-econometric results are not due to differences in specifications or control variables, as only including a
networking measure which is comparable to the macro-econometric measure of networking does not alter the
results. The positive effect of negative attitudes on male immigrant education supports the second case of the
theoretical model, where negative attitudes may have differential effects on immigrants/descendants’ propensity
to attend high school depending on their productivity levels. In the case where high productivity workers are
comparable to natives, as outlined in Section 3, negative attitudes only affect low productivity workers. This
leads to lower employment perspectives for these low productivity workers, lowering the future wages that
young immigrants expect to receive and increasing the incentives of young immigrants/descendants to acquire
education.
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9 Robustness of Micro-econometric Results
We explore the robustness of our micro-econometric analysis in the following subsections. In particular, we
explore how negative attitudes affect immigrants compared to descendants as well as examine how the mobility
of immigrants and descendants within Denmark affect the results obtained in Section 8.
9.1 Exploring Mobility of Immigrants and Descendants
While the results presented in Section 8 are supportive of the second case of the theoretical model, it is
possible our estimation fails to properly estimate the impact of negative attitudes on high school attendance.
In particular, we focus on the educational decision of 16 year old individuals in order to disregard mobility
concerns, as students of this age are likely to reside at home in this period. While this may be the case, it could
be that parents either selectively locate to certain municipalities or move as a reaction to negative attitudes in a
municipality. This would create problems for our analysis, particularly if immigrant families who move do so in
order to avoid negative attitudes against them. We examine the possibility that movers are driving the positive
effect of negative attitudes we see for males in Appendix A by exploring if our results are stable to restricting
the sample to individuals who have resided in the same house for 3 or more years and 6 or more years. Similarly,
we look at years since immigration for the non-native sample in order to see if recent immigrants, who could
have selectively located within Denmark, are driving our results.
On the whole, the results presented in Appendix A are very similar to the main results. For males, the
negative attitude variable always increases the propensity to attend high school for immigrants/descendants,
while there is no effect seen for natives. This is true for both the 3 or more years restriction as well as the 6
or more years restriction. The fraction of own nationality immigrants employed also increases an immigrant’s
propensity to attend high school, a finding which is consistent with the main results of Section 8. For females,
the effects of negative attitudes for natives and immigrants remain insignificant when imposing the years since
moved restriction.
A similar pattern is seen for estimation restricting the time since immigration for immigrants and descend-
ants; the positive estimated effect of negative attitudes on the propensity to attend high school remains for males
and is still insignificant for females.14 The effect of negative attitudes on high school attendance is remarkably
robust for male immigrants, and is not driven by either mobility within Denmark or selective migration, while
for female immigrants, this relationship remains insignificant.
9.2 Comparing Immigrants to Descendants
Table 13 analyses the high school decision of immigrants and descendants separately, allowing the effects of
negative attitudes on education to affect the two groups differently. While immigrants and descendants can
both be impacted by negative attitudes, descendants have been raised in Denmark and may have assimilated
more compared to immigrants. As we expect that descendants may be less adversely impacted by negative
attitudes, finding a larger impact of negative attitudes on immigrants than on descendants would support that
the voting data captures negative attitudes while finding a larger impact for descendants would raise concerns
about the validity of this measure. Due to the few numbers of descendants in a given municipality, males
and females are combined into one sample, and a dummy for male is included as a control variable. For the
same reason, the results presented in Table 13 should be interpreted with some caution, as there are some
municipalities with very few descendants residing in them.
Estimation using only immigrants is reported in column (1) of Table 13 while estimation on a sample of
only descendants is reported in column (2). Comparing these two columns reveals that the positive impact of
negative attitudes on high school attendance seen previously is driven by the impact of negative attitudes on
immigrants, while virtually no effect is seen on the probability of attending high school for descendants. It is
14Descendants, by definition, have “immigrated” when they are born, so all descendants are included in both the years since
immigrated tables.
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also reassuring that household and municipality controls are relatively similar for immigrants and descendants,
as while negative attitudes may affect the two groups differently, there is less reason to believe that immigrants
and descendants would be differentially affected by other controls.
10 Conclusion
We considered the impact of negative attitudes and immigration on educational choice of immigrants and
natives. We did this theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, we formulated a Becker-style taste discrimination model within a search and wage bargaining
setting. We assumed that potential negative tastes towards immigrants implied that their separation rate from
the job was higher than the separation rate of a native worker. Furthermore, we allowed for networking effects,
which increased the probability of obtaining employment. We included endogenous education, where a higher
expected income as educated in terms of both employment chances and wages relative to the expected income
as uneducated, increases the number of educated workers. We considered two different cases. In the first case,
discrimination existed for all immigrants, while it was only present in the sector employing uneducated workers
in the second case. We found that an increase in negative attitudes reduced education for immigrants in the
first case, increased education in the second case, where there was no impact on natives in the two cases. We
also found that more immigration improved employment perspectives for immigrants and thereby increased
the fraction of educated immigrants due to increased networking. Finally, we considered endogenous negative
attitudes in the sense that more immigration increased negative attitudes. In this case, the impact of more
immigration on the educational level of immigrants was ambiguous.
Empirically, we considered an immigrant’s high school attendance as a function of the variables in the
theoretical model. Considering high school attendance allowed us to disregard mobility issues for the individual
acquiring education. On the macro-level, we confirmed the result from the first case of the model, namely an
existence of a negative correlation between negative attitudes towards immigrants and high school attendance
by exploring the variation between 266 municipalities in Denmark. As identification, we ran the regression
for natives, and found no significant correlation. Weighting this regression by the total number of 16 year
old immigrants in the municipality reveals that smaller municipalities with few 16 year old immigrants may
be driving these results. On the individual level, we used Danish register data to find a positive impact of
networking on high school attendance, whereas the impact of negative attitudes has a positive and significant
effect on male immigrants, and a positive but insignificant effect for female immigrants. This is consistent with
the second case of the theoretical model, where negative attitudes are prevalent in the sector hiring low skilled
workers and more severe negative attitudes increase the incentives to acquire education. We explore the validity
of disregarding mobility by estimating the same regressions on immigrants and natives who have not moved or
immigrated recently, and find virtually identical effects of negative attitudes on education.
If negative attitudes are most prevalent in the uneducated sector, and the second case of the model is then
the most realistic one, negative attitudes cannot be the explanation behind the lower fraction of immigrants
attending high school. Rather, one potential benefit from negative attitudes towards immigrants may be that
they induce more immigrants to continue school beyond the 9th grade and thus improve their employment
chances, wages, and expected lifetime income significantly. On the other hand, as immigrants tend to benefit
from networking with their own nationality, a low fraction of immigrants in a municipality seems to partly explain
the low fraction of immigrant high school attendance. Hence, our results indicate that potential immigrant high
school students have higher incentives to attend high school in an area where many of their own nationality lives
as it improves their networking chances. While we cannot exclude that variables other than negative attitudes
and networking can explain the high school educational gap between immigrant and natives, the main empirical
finding of this paper is that, when negative attitudes affect only low skilled workers, more immigrants of ones
own nationality and more severe negative attitudes in a region increases the fraction of immigrants attending
high school.
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Figure 1: Municipal Fractions of Votes for Fremskridtpartiet and Dansk Folkeparti in 2001 General Election
Figure 2: Municipal Fractions of Immigrants and Descendants Residing in Municipality
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Table 1: Summary Statistics at the Municipal Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Share of 16 year old immigrants in any high school 0.331 0.333 0.245 0.000 1.000
Share of 16 year old natives in any high school 0.529 0.524 0.074 0.368 0.763
Negative attitude variable based on 2001 election
data
0.132 0.130 0.023 0.071 0.210
Fraction with negative attitudes, survey 0.196 0.128 0.258 0.000 1.000
Network for immigrants (share of
immigrants/descendants)
0.049 0.037 0.032 0.020 0.252
‘Network’ for natives (share of natives) 0.951 0.963 0.032 0.748 0.980
Unemployment rate, immigrants, western countries 0.051 0.046 0.032 0.000 0.182
Unemployment rate, immigrants non-Western
countries
0.110 0.091 0.094 0.000 0.727
Unemployment rate, natives 0.036 0.033 0.013 0.015 0.096
Gross income per capita in 100000 DKK 1.726 1.671 0.192 1.448 2.771
Population density 0.271 0.071 0.819 0.019 10.413
Share with short education 0.401 0.402 0.034 0.271 0.503
Share with medium education 0.106 0.102 0.028 0.063 0.242
Share with long education 0.031 0.023 0.028 0.007 0.204
Fraction with high school in municipality 0.477 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Observations 266
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Table 2: High School Participation for Immigrants and Natives at the Municipal Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frac Native Frac Imm Frac Native Frac Imm
Enrolled HS Enrolled HS Enrolled HS Enrolled HS
% Fremskridtspartiet and -0.778*** -1.993*Dansk Folkeparti GE 2001
(0.207) (1.037)
% Munc. Pop with Neg. Attitudes 0.002 -0.103
(0.015) (0.086)
% Native -0.130 0.151
(0.114) (0.092)
% Immigrants/Descendants 2.464*** 1.951***
(0.596) (0.557)
% Natives Unemployed -0.878** -0.957***
(0.265) (0.317)
% Western Imm Unemp. -0.920 -0.497
(0.621) (0.703)
% Non-Western Imm Unemp. -0.193 -0.286
(0.180) (0.241)
Gross Income Per Capita/100000 0.072 0.087 0.001 0.158
(0.049) (0.238) (0.063) (0.269)
Population Density (per 1000) -0.007** 0.010 -0.008** 0.005
(0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012)
% of LF with Short Tertiary Educ. 0.081 -0.297 0.189 -0.685
(0.169) (0.773) (0.221) (0.915)
% of LF with Medium Tertiary Educ. -0.266 -1.166 -0.012 -0.985
(0.176) (0.964) (0.1845) (0.877)
% of LF with Long Tertiary Educ. 0.127 -2.163 0.825 -1.768
(0.439) (1.995) (0.505) (2.180)
High School in Municipality 0.011 0.060* 0.023*** 0.067*
(0.007) (0.037) (0.008) (0.040)
R2 0.234 0.076 0.195 0.082
N 266 266 220 220
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity. Neg. Att. is the negative attitude variable which is
either measured as the share of votes for the Fremskridtspartiet or Dansk Folkeparti or as the share of people with a
negative attitude from the survey. Network of the immigrants and descendants is measured as the fraction of
immigrants and descendants in the municipalities. For the natives we include the same type of share-variable.
Vocational education is included in the short tertiary category. Medium education also includes bachelor degrees. An
intercept is included in the model but not reported in the table. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: High School Participation for Immigrants and Natives at the Municipal Level - Weighted by Number
of 16 Year Old Natives and Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frac Native Frac Imm Frac Native Frac Imm
Enrolled HS Enrolled HS Enrolled HS Enrolled HS
% Fremskridtspartiet and -0.561*** 0.346Dansk Folkeparti GE 2001
(0.198) (0.663)
% Munc. Pop with Neg. Attitudes 0.018 -0.008
(0.015) (0.061)
% Native 0.117 0.313
(0.097) (0.086)
% Immigrants/Descendants 0.813*** 0.882***
(0.302) (0.252)
% Natives Unemployed -0.842*** -0.996***
(0.273) (0.290)
% Western Imm Unemp. -0.509 -0.313
(0.481) (0.525)
% Non-Western Imm Unemp. -0.035 -0.050
(0.158) (0.181)
Gross Income Per Capita/100000 0.066 -0.016 0.017*** 0.071
(0.051) (0.156) (0.054) (0.163)
Population Density (per 1000) -0.005 0.004 -0.005* 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
% of LF with Short Tertiary Educ. 0.185 0.835 0.197 0.684
(0.151) (0.571) (0.181) (0.608)
% of LF with Medium Tertiary Educ. -0.387** -0.354 -0.119 -0.539
(0.194) (0.628) (0.194) (0.653)
% of LF with Long Tertiary Educ. 0.369 0.360 0.719 -0.212
(0.453) (1.466) (0.468) (1.536)
High School in Municipality 0.021*** 0.187*** 0.027*** 0.180***
(0.007) (0.030) (0.008) (0.033)
R2 0.322 0.299 0.305 0.300
N 266 266 220 220
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity. Neg. Att. is the negative attitude variable which is
either measured as the share of votes for the Fremskridtspartiet or Dansk Folkeparti or as the share of people with a
negative attitude from the survey. Network of the immigrants and descendants is measured as the fraction of
immigrants and descendants in the municipalities. For the natives we include the same type of share-variable.
Vocational education is included in the short tertiary category. Medium education also includes bachelor degrees. An
intercept is included in the model but not reported in the table. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics at the Individual Level
(1)
% Fremskridtspartiet and Dansk Folkeparti GE 2001 0.1274
(0.0241)
Munc. Unemployment Rate 0.0521
(0.0150)
Munc. Population Density 709.8157
(1507.2081)
Munc. Gross Income Per Cap/10000 17.5920
(2.0569)
Native 0.9399
(0.2377)
Immigrant 0.0382
(0.1918)
Descendant 0.0219
(0.1463)
% of Natives Aged 16 in Regular HS 0.6981
(0.0000)
% of Imm./Desc. Aged 16 in Regular HS 0.5046
(0.0000)
% of Natives Aged 16 in Any HS 0.7424
(0.0000)
% of Imm./Desc. Aged 16 in Any HS 0.5265
(0.0000)
Male 0.5106
(0.4999)
Mother Years of Education 12.5465
(2.9230)
Father Years of Education 12.3335
(3.0405)
Parents Married 0.6853
(0.4644)
Father Emp Prev Dec. 0.8485
(0.3586)
Mother Emp Prev Dec. 0.8299
(0.3757)
Household Income/10000DKK 62.0223
(50.7021)
High School in Municipality 0.7241
(0.4470)
Observations 53256
Mean values shown for 16 year old individuals residing in Denmark in 2002 unless
otherwise indicated. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5: High School Participation for Male 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status
(1) (2) (3)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 -0.012 1.478** 1.483***
(0.180) (0.578) (0.568)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.094 0.124
(0.096) (0.151)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.085 0.476***
(0.179) (0.166)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.031 -1.073 -1.115
(0.154) (0.747) (0.724)
Mother Years of Education 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Father Years of Education 0.016*** 0.006* 0.006*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Parents Married 0.064*** 0.113*** 0.113***
(0.007) (0.033) (0.034)
Father Emp Prev Dec. 0.053*** 0.073*** 0.081***
(0.009) (0.028) (0.028)
Mother Emp Prev Dec. 0.102*** 0.067** 0.082***
(0.009) (0.026) (0.025)
Household Income/100000DKK 0.003** 0.012* 0.014**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
% Natives Unemp. -0.251
(0.394)
% Western Imm Unemp. -0.086 -0.136
(0.630) (0.636)
% Non Western Imm Unemp. 0.112 -0.032
(0.213) (0.217)
Population Density (per 1000) -0.004 0.008 0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
High School in Municipality 0.018** 0.041 0.063
(0.008) (0.038) (0.039)
Country of Origin Dummies? No Yes Yes
R2 0.064 0.192 0.186
N 25526 1669 1669
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any
HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular high school, business high school, or vocational
training programs (apprenticeships).
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Table 6: High School Participation for Female 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status
(1) (2) (3)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 -0.206 0.836 0.869
(0.184) (0.582) (0.590)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.262** -0.066
(0.101) (0.172)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.162 0.167
(0.198) (0.191)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.326** 1.811* 1.824*
(0.133) (1.028) (1.029)
Mother Years of Education 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Father Years of Education 0.014*** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Parents Married 0.066*** 0.046 0.045
(0.008) (0.039) (0.038)
Father Emp Prev Dec. 0.076*** 0.059** 0.062**
(0.009) (0.025) (0.025)
Mother Emp Prev Dec. 0.111*** 0.072*** 0.075***
(0.008) (0.027) (0.026)
Household Income/100000DKK 0.006** 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
% Natives Unemp. -0.805**
(0.404)
% Western Imm Unemp. -1.247** -1.351**
(0.595) (0.589)
% Non Western Imm Unemp. 0.177 0.153
(0.213) (0.221)
Population Density (per 1000) 0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
High School in Municipality 0.021** 0.149*** 0.154***
(0.009) (0.044) (0.043)
Country of Origin Dummies? No Yes Yes
R2 0.082 0.236 0.235
N 24528 1533 1533
Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular high school, business high school, or vocational
training programs (apprenticeships).
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Appendices
A Robustness Checks
A.1 3 or More Years Since Moved
Table 7: High School Participation for Male 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status - 3 or More Years Since Moved
(1) (2)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 0.054 1.781**
(0.192) (0.718)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.068 0.450*
(0.100) (0.239)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.036 0.035
(0.175) (0.225)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.031 -1.613*
(0.163) (0.840)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? No Yes
R2 0.052 0.120
N 21861 1276
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 5.
Table 8: High School Participation for Female 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status - 3 or More Years Since Moved
(1) (2)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 -0.131 0.594
(0.190) (0.567)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.234** 0.069
(0.102) (0.210)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.097 0.110
(0.191) (0.218)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.389*** 1.308
(0.133) (0.896)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? No Yes
R2 0.062 0.153
N 20795 1171
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 6.
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A.2 6 or More Years Since Moved
Table 9: High School Participation for Male 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status - 6 or More Years Since Moved
(1) (2)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 0.177 2.428***
(0.184) (0.880)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.003 0.461
(0.092) (0.355)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp -0.106 0.048
(0.163) (0.279)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.124 -1.883*
(0.137) (1.051)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? No Yes
R2 0.045 0.112
N 18259 928
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 5.
Table 10: High School Participation for Female 16 Year Olds by Immigrant Status - 6 or More Years Since
Moved
(1) (2)
Native - Any Imm/Desc - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 -0.060 0.179
(0.213) (0.643)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS -0.183 -0.060
(0.112) (0.267)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.035 0.121
(0.212) (0.281)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.445*** 0.879
(0.166) (1.034)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? No Yes
R2 0.054 0.133
N 17435 853
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 6.
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A.3 3 or More Years Since Immigrated
Table 11: High School Participation for Immigrant/Descendant 16 Year Olds - 3 or More Years Since Immigrated
(1) (2)
Male - Any Female - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 1.713*** 0.881
(0.625) (0.561)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS 0.475** -0.025
(0.219) (0.222)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.117 -0.049
(0.203) (0.209)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. -1.025 1.494
(0.757) (0.921)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? Yes Yes
R2 0.137 0.156
N 1524 1398
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 5
and 6.
A.4 6 or More Years Since Immigrated
Table 12: High School Participation for Immigrant/Descendant 16 Year Olds - 6 or More Years Since Immigrated
(1) (2)
Male - Any Female - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 1.761*** 0.629
(0.620) (0.524)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS 0.487** -0.179
(0.235) (0.209)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.052 0.055
(0.215) (0.204)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. -1.109 1.221
(0.816) (0.821)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? Yes Yes
R2 0.123 0.135
N 1393 1274
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either enrollment in regular
high school, business high school, or vocational training programs (apprenticeships).
Includes same parental education, household, and municipality controls as Table 5
and 6.
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A.5 Immigrants vs. Descendants
Table 13: High School Participation for Immigrants and Descendants
(1) (2)
Immigrant - Any Descendant - Any
HS Ongoing HS Ongoing
% Both Parties GE 2001 1.582*** -0.124
(0.499) (0.560)
Frac of Own Nat. >= HS 0.071 -0.046
(0.111) (0.268)
Frac of Own Nat. Emp 0.342** 0.300
(0.134) (0.242)
Frac of Munc Pop Own Nat. 0.976 0.496
(1.545) (0.725)
Male -0.054** -0.073**
(0.024) (0.029)
Parental Education Controls? Yes Yes
Household Controls? Yes Yes
Municipality Controls? Yes Yes
Origin Country Dummies? Yes Yes
R2 0.234 0.097
N 2037 1165
Standard errors reported in parentheses clustered at municipality level. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Any HS Ongoing corresponds to either
enrollment in regular high school, business high school, or vocational training
programs (apprenticeships). Includes same parental education, household,
and municipality controls as Table 5 and 6.
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